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Introduction
Poor countries’ debt problems briefly veiled by overliquidity during the 1970s had existed
long before the conventional date of August 1982. The Pearson Report (Pearson et al, 1969,
pp.153ff) prepared on request of the president of the IBRD, strongly recommended debt re-
lief. Its finding that debt management had emphasised spending cuts and credit restrictions,
neglecting the need to sustain sound development outlays sounds quite modern and topical.
Nevertheless it took many years, until the Cologne Summit of 1999, before the negative ef-
fects of post-1982 debt management on poverty were explicitly recognised officially.
Identifying insolvency rather than illiquidity as the problem, Abbott (1972) already proposed
debt cancellation. Accepting the need for debt alleviation major creditors adopted the so-
called Retroactive Terms Adjustment (RTA) in 1978, measures to provide debt relief and to
improve the net flow of bilateral official aid to Low Income Countries. Their debts were
mostly caused by official flows, including aid. One should mention the co-responsibility of
official creditors, who decide and monitor where and how their money is spent. The pro-
gramme's long-winded, clumsy name documents the creditors' desire to avoid the words debt
relief or debt cancellation, not to mention insolvency. This steadfast refusal to recognise re-
alities officially has remained the most important hindrance to proper debt management and to
a viable solution of the crisis until the present day.
The IMF started "Structural Adjustment" in Africa well before 1982 according to Finance &
Development: after 1973 (Kanesa-Thasan 1981). Officially, the IBRD started its involvement
in programme lending in 1980, but it had exerted influence in connection with projects before.
The Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), particularly the IMF, did not arrive on the scene after
August 1982 to solve a problem created by others, but they had been part of the process lead-
ing to it (cf. Raffer 1994). Their type of adjustment did not prevent the debt crisis. The date
1982 disguises the long and dismal record of debt management and the ineffectiveness of the
policies enforced by the BWIs in restoring the sustainable economic viability of debtor coun-
tries.
With this background, this paper will first briefly assess the damages caused to the poorest
countries by protracted unsuccessful debt management, showing why it is both economically
inefficient, and denies people in debtor countries basic human rights granted to all other debt-
ors, as well as minimum standards of the Rule of Law. Finally, debt arbitration modelled after
the basic principles of US Chapter 9 insolvency for debtors with governmental powers will be
briefly sketched, taking the particular situation of poor countries into account.
Creditor Caused Damage
All historical cases of sovereign overindebtedness show that large percentages of debts must
eventually be cancelled. Since the Toronto Terms this is officially recognised for poor coun-
tries as well, but their debt overhang has increased, because creditors dominating debt man-
agement have always given too little and too late. Protracted manœvring added unpayable
debts, burdened the debtor, made debt relief look more expensive than it is.
The economic inadvisability of present debt management causing unpayable debts to grow
further can be shown with extremely basic mathematics. At an interest rate of m%, no amorti-K. Raffe r- Debt Relief for Low Income Countries WIDER Conference, Helsinki, Aug. 2001 page2
sation, and actually paid interest service of n% (n < m) debts grow by (m-n)% annually.
Capitalising arrears over k years at constant m and n multiplies debts by [1 + (m-n)](k-1) if
arrears occur first at the end of year 1. This increase comes on top of already unpayable debts.
The burden increases, the percentage of debts that can actually be serviced is continuously
reduced. A simple illustrative example assuming m = 5% total debts of $1000 at the begin-
ning of year 1, and a slightly increasing n of initially m/2 shows that debts grow by $247 over
ten years (cf. Raffer 1998). More sophisticated assumptions, such as introducing amortisa-
tions, would not change the basic mechanism. Capitalised arrears increase debt stocks, as
anyone familiar with basic mathematical operations can verify. The gaps between debt service
due and actually paid widen in the example, although the debtor pays steadily more debt
service, possibly so because of the lemon squeezer effect of "Structural Adjustment". Debts
accumulate in the books of creditors with increasing shares of "phantom debts" (ibid.), debts
without any economic base as they are uncollectible. Caused by creditors unwilling to ac-
knowledge insolvency, they boost nominal debts to ever more unrealistic heights, making
debt reductions to economically sustainable levels appear costlier and costlier on paper. For-
giving $520 at the end of year 2 would have restored the debtor's viability in Raffer’s numeri-
cal example. Finally, $672 must be cancelled to allow honouring all obligations. $152 - totally
irrecouperable, pure phantom debts - result from the creditor’s unwillingness to grant timely
reduction.
The assumption that actual payments are always roughly half the payments due is quite opti-
mistic. Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) has paid less than one fifth of the amounts due recently (see
Table 1). Despite high net transfers HIPC-debts have kept growing. The IBRD (1997, p.42)
acknowledged the effects of delaying relief:
The surge in borrowing, coupled with increasing reliance on resched-
uling and refinancing, increased the nominal stock of debts of HIPCs
from $55 billion in 1980 to $183 billion in 1990 ... by the end of 1995
it had reached $215 billion.
The slowdown from an annual growth rate of 12.77 per cent to 3.28 per cent in the 1990s was
achieved by a shift towards more grants, higher concessionality and forgiving ODA debts.
The IBRD (ibid., p.44) acknowledged: "In many HIPCs the negative impact of external debts
seems to come more from the growing debt stock rather than from the excessive burden of
debt service actually paid." In plain English: countries pay little, capitalising a lot of arrears.
According to UNCTAD (1998, p.127) two thirds of the increase in SSA’s debt since 1989
was due to arrears. Such figures clearly prove a situation of technical insolvency, the building
up of phantom debts. Secondary markets for private claims or internal valuations by official
creditors reflect phantom debts. The Washington Post (16 March 1999) reported that $3 bil-
lion of "forgiven" debt would actually mean "maximum budget cost" of $190 million, as the
rest had been "essentially written down or written off as uncollectible." Economically these
claims were valued at 6.33 per cent of face value. At the Cologne summit Chancellor
Schröder told in an interview that essentially debts were forgiven that could not have been
collected. By including phantom debts official figures on the cost of debt relief are boosted.
They hide the fact that real costs of meaningful debt reductions - in the sense of money that
can actually be recouped, and which can therefore actually be "forgiven"- are much lower.
Economically, one cannot lose money one cannot get anyway.
The large debt overhang of poor countries is not at all reflected in conventional debt indica-
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payments by export earnings. Therefore, both suffer from ambiguity, being equally low if a
country is fairly debt free or if a heavily indebted country simply cannot pay. The less it pays
- the higher its debt overhang becomes - the lower these indicators will be, while arrears ac-
cumulate. As arrears are the clearest sign of a debt overhang, the relation between payments
effected and payments due
0£DSR/DSRd*£1( 1 )
was proposed as a better index (Raffer 1996). It is 1 if all payments are made on time, zero if
the debtor does not pay at all. In contrast to conventional indicators it is unambiguous. Theo-
retically DSRd*, which we may call the real debt service ratio, must include all payments due
but not effected including interest arrears and amortisation of short term debt, all amounts
rescheduled early because they could not have been honoured when contractually due, and
loans solely granted to avoid formal default. Table 1 includes arrears of interest and principal
as published by the IBRD (2000), rescheduled interest and principal, debt "forgiven", and
capitalised interest. Figures on "Debt Stock Rescheduled" are not included because the
IBRD's explanations suggest that this is not exclusively principal due or already in arrears
during the year of rescheduling. Relevant data permitting to allocate rescheduled principal to
the years when it was originally due, are not available. For such practical reasons DSRd
* in
Table 1 - while an improvement on traditional debt indicators - still understates the burden of
debt service.
Table 1: The Evolution of the Debt Overhang of Poor Countries
1980 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
SSA
DSR 7.2 12.9 9.2 14.6 15.3 14.2 14.7 14.7 14.8
DSRd
* 11.4 55.6 73.2 94.7 83.8 79.2 73.8 83.3 n.a.
DSR/DSRd
* 0.632 0.232 0.126 0.154 0.183 0.179 0.199 0.176 n.a.
LICs
DSR n.a. 21.4 18.6 17.8 17.9 16.6 15.1 15.4 14.7
DSRd
* n.a. 46.3 47.0 47.2 43.9 39.7 33.6 35.3 n.a.
DSR/DSRd
* n.a. 0.462 0.395 0.377 0.408 0.418 0.449 0.436 n.a.
LICs Low Income Countries
n.a. not available
Source: DSR from IBRD (2000), rest calculated from this source
Table 1 shows DSRd
* for the two groups of poor countries for which sufficient data are pub-
lished by the IBRD (2000). Contrasting the two DSRs in Table 1 shows the full extent of the
debt burden, and contrasts the conventional and my indicator. Although some slight im-
provements are recognisable during the second half of the 1990s, LICs as a group still paid
perceptibly less than half of what they should have paid. The situation of SSA is dramatically
worse. The average/representative country of each group is clearly insolvent.
Data necessary to calculate DSRd
* for Severely Indebted Low Income Countries (SILICs) or
HIPCs are not published there. For SILICs interest arrears alone were 83.4 per cent of total
debt service. Adding only these would result in a DSRd of 45.3 instead of 24.7 obtained on the
cash base. Sufficiently detailed data for the SILIC-group were published by the World Debt
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would have to calculate them by adding individual country data. It is surprising too that simi-
lar data on the HIPC-group are not published there either although so much attention is fo-
cussed on them. Embarrassingly high arrears officially highlighting the insufficiency of pres-
ent debt policies cannot be immediately excluded as a logical reason.
The IBRD (1992, p.10ff, stress in original) recognised the fact of insolvency at the beginning
of the 1990s, when it claimed that the debt crisis for big Latin American debtors was over,
and actual insolvency relief thus not necessary:
In a solvency crisis, early recognition of solvency as the root cause
and the need for a final settlement are important for minimizing the
damage. ...protracted renegotiations and uncertainty damaged eco-
nomic activity in debtor countries for several years ... It took too long
to recognize that liquidity was the visible tip of the problem, but not
its root.
This damaging delay was caused by defenders of the so-called illiquidity theory in the 1980s,
notably the IMF and the IBRD, positing that the debt crisis was a liquidity, not a solvency
crisis. As most explicit advocates they supported this theory by overly optimistic forecasts
"showing" that debtors would "grow out of" debts. Neither Bank, Fund nor other official
creditors see their delaying tactics as a reason for compensating at least part of the damage
caused by them.
In spite of the IBRD's insightful statement insolvency has remained anathema with official
creditors, especially with International Financial Institutions (IFIs), including the Bank. The
British government is one exception, strongly and repeatedly advocating more adequate debt
relief, from the Toronto Terms to the Mauritius Mandate. Its Trinidad Terms were so bold that
it took the Paris Club years of delay to accept them. Doing so earlier would have defused the
debt problem considerably. Typically, official creditors responsible for delays qualified as
wrong and damaging to debtor economies by the IBRD, go on delaying.
From "Structural Adjustment" to HIPC II: The Fatal Flaw of Creditor Dominance
Instead of referring to the substantial amount of literature on whether "Structural Adjustment"
worked, suffice it to point out that after over a quarter of a century sustainable economic vi-
ability has not been restored in one single SSA-country. This in itself is a clear verdict, com-
parable to professional opinion on a shoe salesperson not selling a single pair of shoes for
decades.
The IBRD (1989, p.21) referred to the problem that "Structural Adjustment" is particularly ill
suited for poor countries, calling it "also more severe than that of other HICs [Highly Indebted
Countries]", although in the context of middle-income countries in SSA. In spite of "slightly
lower" debt-exports ratios these African countries
have a lower capacity to adjust to their debt overhang...Their export
structures are generally more rigid, with a higher share concentrated in
a few primary commodities; export growth has been erratic and lower
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These problems are much more pronounced in poorer countries, such as Least Developed
Countries, as their exports and production structures are even more rigid and concentrated.
The ineffectiveness of "Structural Adjustment" was also recognised by various "Terms" of the
Paris Club. Claiming at Venice that all could be repaid, official creditors have meanwhile
arrived at Cologne Terms with 90 per cent Net Present Value (NPV) reduction on eligible
debts. The economic sense behind a "solution" such as the debt service option, under which
this reduction is achieved "through concessional interest rates and a repayment period of 125
years, including 65 years of grace" (IBRD 2000, p.171) remains unclear at best. Similarly, the
"'bullet' option" with an interest rate of 0.0001 per cent (the IBRD does nor dare write over
how many years) would be ridiculed in the case of all other debtor-creditor relations. Politi-
cally, though, such solutions provide a long term leverage over poor countries.
The high percentages of debt relief quoted by the Paris Club are prime examples of mislead-
ing figures making insufficient debt relief look "generous". Only so-called pre-cut-off debts
are eligible for relief. The cut-off date is when the debtor asked the Paris Club for debt relief
the first time, which can be early in the 1980s. With an early enough cut-off date 100 per cent
"debt forgiveness" may mean a reduction of less than 1 per cent of total debts. Eventually debt
relief converges to zero, while percentages "forgiven" converge to 100 - in plain English: to-
wards 100 per cent Paris Club "debt relief" without a single cent actually forgiven.
Errors producing insufficient debt relief initially are transmitted, compromising viable solu-
tions in the future. Too little relief at the first try causes new problems and becomes difficult
if not impossible to remedy later under this system. Since creditors have always been reluctant
to recognise the dimension of the problem and estimates of future export incomes and growth
by IFIs on which relief was based have been notoriously "optimistic", first relief measures by
the Paris Club were apparently too limited. Creditors thus foiled a quick and proper solution,
as the changes from Venice to Cologne prove clearly.
Applying the NPV-concept to debts is also highly misleading. Discounting future debt service
payments with non-concessional interest rates reduces debt burdens considerably on paper.
The NPV of all HIPC-debts was about $190 billion at the end of 1994, while their nominal
debts were $241 billion (IMF 1997, p.15). But sustainability based on NPVs is meaningless.
The concept is used for investment decisions as streams of revenues and outlays can only be
compared meaningfully at the same point of time. It makes sense there because $100 today is
actually equivalent to $105 after a year if invested at 5%. Discounted values provide useful
information for comparing expected streams of payments. Discounting to calculate grant ele-
ments of aid may make sense too, even though assuming a 10 per cent market interest rate is
unwarranted, exaggerating donors' "generosity".
But in the case of debts discounting at market interest rates simply states that if the debtor had
the NPV today and could invest it at the discount rate, all debts would be covered - logically
true but unhelpful. HIPCs, e.g., qualify as such precisely because they do not have spare
money for such investments. Usually they are even unable to honour all financial commit-
ments at concessional terms - which means that these terms are already too tough for them.
Using NPVs is like demanding a malnourished, burdened person to run 100 meters in 13 sec-
onds, rightly drawing attention to a 30% element of concessionality in comparison with 10
seconds.
HIPC-thresholds of "sustainability" were arbitrarily chosen, obviously with the scope of
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as much after debt relief as before or even more. The 150/15 benchmarks considered "gener-
ous" for the poorest countries by the Cologne Summit compare unfavourably with Germany's
debt indicators before the London Accord granted debt relief in 1953. Its debt service ratio
had been less than 4 per cent (Hersel 1998), which was considered unsustainable for Europe-
ans in contrast to 15 per cent for HIPCs now. In 1952 Germany's debt export ratio was 85 per
cent, well below the 150 of Cologne, even the IBRD's (2000, p.142) upper limit for "Less-
indebted" countries. The successful economic policies Germany was allowed to pursue, char-
acterised by the term social market economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) were the very opposite
of BWI-type structural adjustment. All in all, Germans were lucky not to depend on Cologne-
type generosity and the BWIs.
Countries that meet all objective economic criteria to be HIPCs are excluded. Although in the
same situation they are denied the same treatment simply because creditors are afraid of costs.
Indonesia, once one of the IBRD's miracles, became a SILIC because of the Asian crisis re-
sulting from capital account liberalisation advised by the BWIs. Although the Bank does not
give percentages, simple divisions of total debts in present value terms and debt service by
export revenues shows that Indonesia had a debt/exports ratio of 251.75 per cent, and a DSR
of 33 per cent in 1998 (IBRD 2000, vol.1, p.145), both above the Cologne thresholds of 150
and 15 respectively. Economically and judged by objective indicators it should qualify for
HIPC now. But as the amount of debts is substantial ($150.8 billion) treating Indonesia as
indicated by objective criteria would be costly on paper. Creditors thus deny this with eco-
nomically unconvincing, bureaucratic reasons.
A similarly interesting example is Nigeria, another SILIC. Classified a HIPC initially, it was
removed from the list in 1998 as no longer meeting the criteria. Its indicators were 250.14 and
11.22 in 1998. However, the low DSR results exclusively from the fact that Nigeria - unable
to pay as due - has been accumulating huge arrears. Since 1993 debt service was a fraction of
interest arrears on long term debt. Arrears of principal were always much higher than these
interest arrears during that period. Simply by adding interest arrears Nigeria's DSR would
have been slightly above 35 per cent in 1997. Adding all principal arrears shown by the Bank
for 1997 would result in a DSR of 90.93 per cent (IBRD 2000, vol.2, p.418). In 1998 the
situation was even worse. Dividing actual debt service plus interest arrears - as shown by the
IBRD - by exports rendered 60.4 per cent. Adding principal arrears in the numerator brings
the result to well over 160 per cent, not surprisingly so, as arrears on long term debt were
slightly higher than export income. Conveniently for creditors the country's very debt over-
hang - producing a low conventional DSR by disregarding substantial arrears - seems to pro-
vide a "reason" to argue that it is not highly indebted, therefore not in need of HIPC treatment.
One wonders whether the still high DSR threshold might even provide a means to increase
actual debt service to at least 15 per cent.
Unrestricted creditor domination is the main problem of present debt management. Too little
is being granted too late, thus prolonging the crisis and human suffering. Decisions are made
arbitrarily, not depending on economic needs but on how "generous" creditors feel at a given
moment. One has to agree to the IBRD's (2000, p.68) conclusions regarding HIPCs:
Many more infants will die either at birth or before they reach the age
of five than in other developing countries, and far fewer will go to
school. ... the vast majority of people living in HIPCs have seen no
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This is not at all a new insight. As early as 1987 the IMF's Managing Director, Michel Cam-
dessus, admitted at ECOSOC that the poorest “too often ... carried the heaviest burden of ad-
justment” (IMF Survey 29 June 1987, p.195). Obviously, this was not seen as a reason to ex-
tend the minimum of debtor protection required by human rights to the South, whose poor
have been subject to a treatment that would be impossible in the case of any debtor within any
OECD country.
Debt Arbitration Modelled after Chapter 9
Already Adam Smith (1979, p.930) recommended state insolvency as the " the measure which
is both least dishonourable to the debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor". Immediately after
1982 David Suratgar, a British banker, recommended to apply corporate insolvency to coun-
tries (US Chapter 11 insolvency). This proposal was taken up and discussed widely. Eco-
nomically it is perfectly sound. Private creditors applied Egyptian insolvency laws to solve
the Egyptian debt crisis of 1876. After a surprisingly short time this concept (including debtor
protection in favour of the population) was economically successful for creditors and debtor
alike (Dommen 1999) - a vivid contrast to present policies of official creditors. There is, how-
ever, a legal killer argument: as reorganisations of firms do by definition not take sovereignty
into account this proposal is not legally viable for sovereigns. Technically right, this is a su-
perb subterfuge for unwilling creditors. But the little known US Chapter 9 insolvency is ap-
plicable to sovereigns. Designed and used for decades in the US as a solution for debtors
vested with governmental powers - so-called municipalities - its basic principles can be im-
mediately applied to sovereign lending. Like all good insolvency laws it combines the need
for a general framework with the flexibility necessary to deal fairly with individual cases.
As this idea, initially proposed in 1987, has been elaborated in detail elsewhere (cf. Raffer
1990; Raffer & Singer 2001, more recent papers at http://mailbox.univie.ac.at/~rafferk5 )t h e
essential elements of this solution with a human face are presented briefly. In the US Chapter
9 deals with debtors having governmental powers, and protects those affected by the compo-
sition plan, giving them a right to be heard. §904 titled "Limitation on Jurisdiction and Powers
of Court" is the crux, making it clear that the court's jurisdiction depends on the municipality's
volition, beyond which it cannot be extended, similar to the jurisdiction of international arbi-
trators. The concept of sovereignty does not contain anything more than what is protected by
§904 in the case of municipalities. The present version of §904 formulates with greatest clar-
ity:
Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents or
the plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree,
in the case or otherwise, interfere with -
(1) any of the political and governmental powers of the debtor
(2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or
(3) the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producing property.
A municipality cannot go into receivership. Elected officials cannot be removed from office
by the court - but, of course, by voters at the next elections. All this makes Chapter 9 espe-
cially suited as the solution of sovereign overindebtedness. The transparency and participation
established by the right to be heard of the affected population are an additional bonus.
During the Great Depression Chapter 9 procedures were introduced precisely to avoid pro-
longed and inefficient negotiations and reschedulings in the case of overindebted US munici-
palities, the kind of "debt management" practised internationally for decades. A first draft by
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rejected by lawmakers as unconstitutional (Spiotto 1993). Creditor interventions usual in de-
veloping countries nowadays were considered inacceptable. A new version containing §904
was enacted. Technically, Chapter 9 thus offers the legal possibility to implement an eco-
nomically sensible solution for sovereign debtors, finally heeding Adam Smith's advice.
Internationally, one technically minor change of its basic framework is necessary: a neutral
court of arbitration, instead of national courts to avoid decisions influenced by national inter-
ests of creditors or debtors. Therefore NGOs, particularly from the South, have often referred
to this solution as a Free and Transparent Process of Arbitration (FTAP), apparently prefer-
ring to avoid the word insolvency. Arbitration is a traditional mechanism of international law,
incorporated into the WTO framework, NAFTA, and suggested for the now shelved MAI. It
is generally quite popular with creditor countries, except when it comes to protecting the
poorest.
To start the process, sovereign debtors could "file" for debt arbitration/insolvency proceedings
by depositing this demand at the UN, e.g. with the Secretary General. Clearly, only debtor
governments would have the right to file. It is their sovereign decision to do so. Beyond
serving as the organisation where sovereign debtors can file their requests for an arbitration
process fairly balancing the interests of creditors and the debtor, the UN could play an im-
portant role, organising the nomination of arbitrators by the two parties, possibly also pro-
viding the limited secretarial services needed by them.
Clearly, the arbitration panel could sit anywhere, including the debtor or its neighbouring
countries. It was never demanded that the panel "be headquartered in a neutral country that is
neither an active international lender nor borrower", as Eichengreen (1999, p.126) erroneously
characterised my proposal. One may suppose this error to stem from the passage: "The reason
why no court, whether located in a creditor or debtor country, should chair the procedures is
self-evident: its impartiality is not guaranteed" (Raffer 1990, pp.304f), which refers to courts,
not courts of arbitration. Language apart, the illustrating example - the US Court of Appeal
for the Second Circuit of New York, definitely no court of arbitration - proves this beyond
doubt. Although other authors - e.g., Rogoff (1999) - do not make this remark, Eichengreen's
error nevertheless suggests the use of "panel" whenever discussing arbitration. This might
also be helpful to differentiate the proposed ad hoc panels from a permanent court of arbitra-
tion. Technically, a permanent entity could handle such cases as well. But ad hoc panels can
be established much more quickly, and too much time has already been wasted because of
creditors. Furthermore it is to be hoped that - once the backlog of cases is resolved - this kind
of arbitration will not be needed frequently. Finally, ad hoc panels might have the advantage
of being custom made for each case.
In the US people affected by the plan have a right to be heard. Internationally, this would, of
course, have to be done by representation. The interests of the population affected by the plan
could be defended by trade unions, entrepreneurs' associations, grassroots organisations, re-
ligious or non-religious NGOs, or international organisations such as UNICEF. The right to
be heard in fair and equitable proceedings and the possibility of describing the expected ef-
fects on the poor in public would certainly have mitigating effects, contributing to an adjust-
ment with a human face. Besides, the arbitrators would have to take particular care to ensure
that a minimum of human dignity of the poor in the debtor country is safeguarded - exactly as
the court would do in a US Chapter 9 insolvency case. This procedure differs fundamentally
from present debt management where creditors are judge, jury, experts and bailiff all in one,
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IFIs, such as the BWIs, cannot be arbitrators. They are party, both controlled by majorities of
creditor states and creditors in their own right. Thus proposing the IMF to fulfil the role of
the panel is absurd. Barring IFIs from being arbitrators is but fair to other - particularly to
private - creditors, as IFIs have not been unbiased when making decisions affecting their own
claims as well as those of other creditors. The publication Emerging Markets this Week (no.
26/1999, October 15; stress in original) of the German Commerzbank expresses this concern
clearly: the Bretton Woods Institutions "will be concerned with protecting their own balance
sheets rather than with fair 'burden sharing'". Therefore the "IMF and World Bank are not
suited either as arbitrators or as objective regulators of sovereign insolvency procedures."
Familiar with insolvency as an appropriate means to solve debt problems in other cases, peo-
ple from the banking community usually see the proposal in a more professional way than
official creditors once it becomes clear that this mechanism must be fair to all sides. It would
not be generally accepted if it were not.
Insolvency relief is not an act of mercy but of justice and economic reason. This shows down
to negligible details such as the fact that the word "forgive" is not commonly used if and when
insolvency procedures reduce debts. This is a right of insolvent debtors, while poor countries
can only beg for "forgiveness". Substantial shares of present debts exist only because of pro-
longed, unsuccessful debt management by official creditors refusing necessary debt relief
over years. Growing phantom debts crush economic recovery and impoverish people further.
This increased debt burden is creditor caused damage, a damage done by delay, as even the
IBRD conceded. Insolvency procedures established themselves as the generally accepted
mechanism because they are the best solution of a debt overhang. The question is thus simply
whether they can be adapted to the specific case of sovereign debtors. Chapter 9, successfully
applied within the US over decades, proves that there is no reason why this should be impos-
sible. It should be clear that we are talking about a traditional tested mechanism to solve the
problem of crushing debt burdens, and it does not matter whether one calls its insolvency or
FTAP, or by whatever other name. The difference to present practice is arbitration instead of
arbitrariness. Having made this proposal in 1987 (Raffer 1989) under the name international
Chapter 9 insolvency, I shall, however, stick to insolvency.
The basic function of any insolvency procedure is the resolution of a conflict between two
fundamental legal principles. In a situation of overindebtedness the right of creditors to inter-
est and repayments collides with the principle recognised generally (not only in the case of
loans) by all civilised legal systems that no one must be forced to fulfil contracts if that leads
to inhumane distress, endangers one’s life or health, or violates human dignity. Briefly put,
debtors cannot be forced to starve themselves or their children to be able to pay. Although
their claims are recognised as legitimate, insolvency exempts resources from being seized by
bona fide creditors. Human rights and human dignity of debtors are given priority over incon-
ditional repayment.
This difference between debtors has not gone unnoticed. The UN Commission on Human
Rights commissioned an independent expert to research the effects of present debt policies
and foreign debt "on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social, and
cultural rights." (Cheru 2001, p.5). In 2000 Italy's Parliament passed a law (Legge 25 Luglio
2000, no.209) on debt relief also requesting the Government to obtain a ruling by the Inter-
national Court of Justice on the consistency between the international regulations governing
developing countries’ foreign debt and the general framework of legal principles and human
and people’s rights. At their meeting at Bologna in June 2001 the Union of Catholic Italian
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government comply with this legal obligation, stressing the need to take the survival and dig-
nity of indebted peoples into account.
It is important to emphasise that insolvency only deals with claims based on solid and proper
legal foundations. In the case of odious debts, e.g., no insolvency is needed. These are null
and void. Demands for cancelling apartheid debts are therefore based on the odious debts
doctrine.
Debtor protection is one of the two essential features of insolvency. The other is the most
fundamental principle of the Rule of Law: no one must be allowed to be judge in one's own
cause. Civilised insolvency laws applicable to all debtors except developing countries demand
a neutral institution assuring fair settlements. Creditors must not decide on their own claims.
Even at the time of debt prisons creditors were not allowed to do so - in contrast to present
international practice violating this very minimum required by the Rule of Law most fla-
grantly. Unrestricted creditor domination is not only an open breach of the Rule of Law, a
principle presently preached to Developing Countries by OECD governments, but also ineffi-
cient from a purely economical perspective, as the prolonged debt crisis proves.
In analogy to the protection granted to the population of indebted municipalities by US
Chapter 9 the money to service a country's debts must not be raised by destroying basic social
services. The principle of debtor protection demands exempting resources necessary to fi-
nance humane minimum standards of basic health services, primary education etc. for the
poor, and funds necessary for sustainable economic recovery - a "fresh start" as US insol-
vency laws put it. This can only be justified if that money is demonstrably used for its de-
clared purpose. Not without reason creditors as well as NGOs are concerned that this might
not always be so.
The solution is quite simple - a transparently managed fund financed by the debtor in domes-
tic currency. In a discussion with public servants of the G7 and representatives of the IMF and
the IBRD Ann Pettifor (1999) proposed a Poverty Action Fund as a means to guarantee that
the money is actually used for the poor and for expenditures necessary for a fresh start of the
debtor economy. The management of such a fund could be monitored by an international
board or advisory council with members from the debtor as well as from creditor countries.
They could be nominated by NGOs and governments (including the debtor’s). As this fund is
a legal entity of its own, checks and discussions of its projects would not concern the gov-
ernment’s budget, which is an important part of a country's sovereignty. Counterpart funds
have worked quite successfully so far. Furthermore the government's situation does not
change. Money it had paid creditors would be paid into the Fund. In both cases it is not at the
government's disposal. Via the Fund, however, the population benefits. Represented at the
board the government has more say about the use of this money. Unless one assumes gov-
ernments absolutely inimical to using money for their own people, preferring to give it to
creditors, this solution is also an improvement for governments.
Resources exempt to finance such Funds are, of course, not phantom debts, but affect claims
that could economically be honoured if debtor protection is denied, if human rights are valued
less than a few dollars more repaid. They are payments which creditors actually waive as they
could actually collect them. In contrast to phantom debts they are real costs to creditors.
Multilateral Claims: A Special Problem of Poor Countries
The poorest countries with little debt to private creditors but substantial multilateral shares
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multilateral shares of all public and publicly guaranteed long term debts were 34.3 and 32.9
per cent respectively in 1999. Therefore the demand of symmetric treatment of all creditors is
of particular importance. But, as the Ecuadorian example shows, symmetric treatment is also
needed in poor Middle Income Countries. Although private creditors had granted a generous
reduction of 45 per cent under Ecuador's Brady deal, this was only reflected in a very small
blip downwards in Ecuador's debt time series, as new official loans pushed debts up again. If
all creditors had cancelled 30 per cent, commercial banks would have saved money, and Ec-
uador would in all probability have been economically afloat again. Bailing-in official credi-
tors, always demanded within an international Chapter 9, is therefore necessary.
Official creditors exerted massive influence on debtor economies, especially so as poor coun-
tries depend heavily on multilateral advice. As early as 1984 the IBRD (1984, p. 24) wrote
that "external financial agencies have shared responsibility" for investments qualified as
"genuine mistakes and misfortunes" without, however, calling for financial consequences. For
decades the IBRD had been proud of its detailed monitoring of projects. Only recently this
pride has not been shown as perceptibly. In the case of the IMF the Group of 24 criticised the
proliferation of performance criteria extending quite often down to microeconomic variables
such as prices for specific products. This difference vis-à-vis private creditors is well charac-
terised by Svendsen's (1987, p.27) distinction between "debtor determined" and "creditor de-
termined" debts. Commercial banks did lend aggressively but have usually not interfered with
their clients' economic policy. IFIs have done so to the extent that countries do not see these
operations as in their interest any longer - they do not "own" them. As debtors have to pay for
IFI-errors this is hardly surprising. This victims-pays-principle is a unique arrangement,
which cannot be justified by economic or legal reasoning (Raffer 1993). Under market condi-
tions international firms do sue their consultants successfully in cases of wrong or negligent
advice. Orange County sued Merill Lynch for $2 billion. Bank Austria sued Price Waterhouse
for £147 million, arguing they had not checked Sovereign Leasing, a firm Bank Austria in-
vested in, with sufficient care. Damage compensation is also awarded to private individuals in
the Anglo-Saxon legal system if a bank goes beyond mere lending. A British couple borrow-
ing money from Lloyds sued the bank successfully, because its manager had advised and en-
couraged them to renovate and sell a house at a profit. The High Court ruled that the manager
should have pointed out the risks clearly and should have advised them to abandon the proj-
ect. Because of its advice Lloyds had to pay damages when prices in the property market fell
and the couple suffered a loss (Financial Times, 5 September 1995). With comparable stan-
dards regarding Southern debtors there would be no multilateral debt problem.
The exception of HIPC apart, multilateral institutions insist on full repayment, even refusing
to reschedule. Even damages caused negligently by their staffs have to be paid for by borrow-
ers that might get burdened with a further loan enabling them to repair the damage financed
by the first. IFIs take economic decisions but refuse to participate in the risks involved. With
IFIs decision making is not only delinked from financial responsibilities, their errors may
even cause financial gains (Raffer 1993). This system is absurdly at odds with the any market
system. The most basic precondition for the functioning of the market mechanism is that eco-
nomic decisions must be accompanied by (co)responsibility. Whoever takes economic deci-
sions must also carry financial risks. If this link is severed - as in the former Centrally Planned
Economies - efficiency is severely disturbed. Bringing the market mechanism to IFIs is there-
fore mandatory. The striking contrast between free-market recommendations given by IFIs
and their own protection from market forces must be abolished. The same percentage must be
deducted from all debts. This is also a way to hold IFIs financially accountable. It is a matter
of fairness to debtors as well as other creditors. Compensation for damages done within proj-
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An issue in its own right it would reduce the debt burden further (Raffer 1993; Raffer &
Singer 1996, 2001).
IFIs argue that foregoing their "preferred creditor status" would deteriorate their own excel-
lent rating as borrowers, increasing costs of lending. This argument is flawed. The IBRD sim-
ply refuses to acknowledge default, even if countries have not paid anything for six or seven
years (Caufield 1998, p.319). Claiming no default as long as such countries stay "in mutual
respectful contact" (ibid.), the IBRD mocks all acceptable accounting rules. If publicly known
though officially denied defaults have not reduced its rating, properly acknowledged and han-
dled default seems unlikely to do so. Apparently, guarantees by OECD governments rather
than its own lending record account for the IBRD's rating. Finally, all multilateral develop-
ment banks have loan loss reserves. A certain amount of lost loans is simply part and parcel of
running banks, economically a necessary part. The possibility of losing money acts as an in-
centive for appropriate care. If the rating argument were true no commercial bank would have
excellent ratings as none gets everything repaid as stipulated. Banking centres such as Lon-
don's City or New York would be perceived as assemblies of credit risks.
Statutes of multilaterals foresee default. Article IV.6 of the IBRD's Articles of Agreement,
e.g., demands a special reserve to cover what Article IV.7 calls "Methods of Meeting Liabili-
ties of the Bank in Case of Defaults". To the extent necessary - if this reserve proves to be
insufficient - "other reserves, surplus and capital available to the Bank" can be used. Appro-
priate amounts of unpaid subscriptions of members can be called. As the Bank is only allowed
to lend either to members or if member states fully guarantee repayment (Article III.4) the
logical conclusion is that sovereign default is definitely considered possible, maybe even an
occasionally needed solution. Unaware of any preferred creditor status, a legal concept which
cannot be found in its Articles of Agreement and does not formally apply to the IBRD (Cau-
field 1998, p.323), its founders wanted the IBRD subject to market discipline rather than to-
tally exempt from it. Mechanisms allowing the Bank to shoulder risks appropriately were de-
signed. Thwarting its founders' intentions the IBRD has refused to use them, wrongly claim-
ing this would make development finance inoperational. The IBRD's very statute proves that
financial accountability is necessary and possible.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) writes off losses, and sub-
mits to arbitration (also foreseen for the IBRD). The EBRD proves that IFIs can survive fi-
nancial accountability and market risk if they are properly managed. Poor countries are usu-
ally soft window clients. Funds, such as IDA, can simply waive repayments without facing
any economic problems. Only the IMF poses some difficulties. Initially, the IMF's Articles of
Agreement did not allow conditionality, and the Fund's resources were only supposed to
bridge short term problems of defending fixed parities. Unlike in the IBRD’s case no provi-
sions for loan losses were therefore needed. When the IMF introduced conditionality, no ap-
propriate changes regarding accountability were made. When the Fund started its massive
operations as a debt manager this became particularly problematic. Introducing financial ac-
countability for its own decisions is thus all the more important. Gold sales (revaluation)
would be one way how the IMF could cover its losses under equal treatment.
Conclusion
HIPC II is again likely to produce insufficient results because of creditor power, prolonging
the debt problem further. An orderly, fair and transparent process respecting human rights and
the Rule of Law is needed - sovereign insolvency or FTAP is economically indicated. Civi-
lised insolvency laws applicable to all debtors except developing countries demand neutral
institutions assuring fair settlements. Creditors must not decide on their own claims - oneK. Raffe r- Debt Relief for Low Income Countries WIDER Conference, Helsinki, Aug. 2001 page13
must not be judge in one's own cause. Debtor protection has to be granted equally to all hu-
man beings.
Last but not least, an international Chapter 9 insolvency would also be an important part of a
New International Architecture, providing incentives to lenders to make loans basically if
repayments can be expected from proceeds. Debts which have to be serviced out of the budget
should remain the exception, particularly so in very poor countries. Being sure to lose their
money eventually, commercial lenders would stop lending if previous loans were not put to
efficient use. Thus, if international insolvency had existed in the 1970s the debt burden would
be much lower, maybe there would not even be any debt crisis. The amount of IFI-activities
would strongly decrease to fewer but economically more viable projects. This is desirable as
no project at all is preferable to a costly flop - at least for those who have to pay for it.
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